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BASEL II – THE REMAINING ISSUES
CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 13
MORITZ M EIER-EWERT
n January 2001, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS)
presented its latest proposals for a revised Capital Adequacy Accord.
The aim of this revision is to address some of the perceived
shortcomings of the 1988 Accord, which is currently being applied. These
new proposals include a number of important improvements, but
unfortunately there is a serious risk that in some areas they are
overshooting their target. As a result they could have adverse consequences
not only for the structure of the banking industry, but also for developing
countries and for systemic stability. Indeed, if implemented in its current
form, the Accord could lead to a serious round of consolidation in the
banking sector resulting in the domination of the market by a handful of
internationally active banks, widen the amplitudes of business cycles as
well as increase the frequency of financial crisis through enhanced
procyclicality, and effectively cut off a number of developing country
borrowers from bank-finance.
In this context, the BCBS has wisely decided to prolong the consultation
period for another year, so that the final draft Accord is expected by the
end of 2002. It is to be hoped that these potential problems of the new
Accord are solved by then. In this context, it is the aim of this paper to
briefly outline four issue-areas that must be addressed before the new
Accord can be implemented with confidence. After a broad outline of the
current state of the proposals in section one, each area will be discussed in
turn. Thus, the second section focuses on the issue of a potential decline in
the overall capital holdings and hence in the level of protection against
systemic risk. The third section then considers the strong procyclical effect
that the new proposals are likely to have. Section four looks at the various
adverse consequences the Accord may have for developing countries, and
the fifth section outlines the potential impact on the structure of the
banking industry. Section six concludes.
1. The new proposals
The new Basel Capital Adequacy Accord aims to adjust the existing
Accord dating back to 1988 to the changed realities in the financial system.
Hence it differs from the old Accord by being more sophisticated with
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regard to risk-measurement and the scope of risk covered. It also provides
greater incentives for active risk-management and risk-mitigation. Most
importantly, however, it no longer subscribes to a „one-size-fits-all“
methodology and allows for an evolutionary regulatory approach, which
gives more highly evolved banks the opportunity to move from the
conventional standardised approach to an advanced one, which will allow
the use of internal ratings.
The new Accord consists of three pillars, the first one of which lists the
minimum capital requirements. In addition to the well-known requirements
for market risk and credit risk, the Second Consultative Package also
introduces a capital requirement on the new category of operational risk.
The risk weights used for each kind of requirement have been refined to be
more sensitive in comparison to the old Accord, and the opportunity for
advanced banks to use internal ratings has been generalised further. The
second pillar contains provisions about supervisory review, which allows
supervisors to set a bank’s capital requirements depending on its risk
profile. Finally, the third pillar provides detailed disclosure requirements so
as to create an environment in which effective market discipline can take
place.
The main objectives of the new Accord remain the same as those of the
original one, namely to strengthen and to safeguard the financial system,
and to enhance competitive equality.  In a number of ways, the proposed
new Accord does fill the gaps created by the divergence between the
regulatory content of the 1988 Accord and the innovation that has occurred
in the financial instruments available to banks ever since its inception.
During the ongoing consultations, the Basel Committee has received a
large amount of comments, and has taken on board a number of them.
1
However, there is reason for concern that some of the potential adverse
consequences of the new Accord for the overall level of capital holdings,
for financial volatility, and for developing countries as well as for the
structure of the banking industry have not yet been adequately addressed
(See Box 1 for an overview). These should be discussed in the remaining
time of the consultation period, which is to last until mid-2002, if the new
Accord is to be a success.
                                                                
1 See: Bank for International Settlements (2001a).B ASEL II – THE R EMAINING ISSUES
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Box 1. The remaining problems of the proposals for Basel II
The following list of potential problems ought to be addressed during the
remainder of the recently prolonged consultation period, before the new Basel
Accord is implemented:
1)  A potential lowering of overall capital reserves, leading to a decline in the
level of protection against systemic risk.
2)  Increased procyclicality of the banking system, created by:
•  Greater risk-sensitivity of the new Accord;
•  The use of (procyclical) external credit rating agencies; and
•  The use of Value-at-risk risk-management tools in a herding
environment;
Procyclicality would enhance the amplitude of the business cycle and increase
the likelihood of financial crises.
3)  Strongly adverse consequences for developing countries, due to
§  Very high capital requirements on low-rated borrowers, cutting them off from
bank lending;
§  Enhancement of the competitive advantage of sophisticated large banks from
industrialised countries; and
§  Potentially large implementation costs for pillars II and III.
4)  Increasing domination of the banking industry by a few large players, with
potentially adverse consequences for small businesses and consumers.
2. The overall level of capital requirements
The minimum capital requirements have for a long time been seen as the
central part of the Basel Accord, and therefore it is not surprising that
despite the introduction of the two new pillars of supervisory review and
effective market discipline, most attention is still being paid to the
implications of the revised Accord for the amount of capital holdings
required of each bank.
2.1 Are the capital requirements too high ?
Although it is the stated aim of the BCBS that the average level of overall
minimum capital required should remain at 8%, the proposals for the new
Accord have generated many fears that capital requirements would
increase. It has been argued that the proposals for a new Accord would put
too heavy a burden on the banking industry, and some of these concerns
are outlined below:MORITZ MEIER-EWERT
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a) The particular distribution of capital requirements
Much concern was caused by the perceived adverse consequences of the
particular distribution of capital requirements across risk-weightings of the
new Accord. As can be seen from Graph 1 (using as an example the
category of corporate borrowers only), the new Accord introduces a
number of new risk-weights to enable banks to distinguish different
categories of borrowers more succinctly.
Graph 1
Notes: The chart shows an approximation of the proposed IRB risk weights for a hypothetical
corporate exposure having LGD equal to 50% (source: paragraphs 175 and 176, the
Consultative Document - The New Basel Capital Accord (January 2001)). The chart also
shows the risk weights under the new standardised approach for a rated corporate exposure,
plotted against the IRB approach using the one year 1981 to 1999 unadjusted average static
pools cumulative default rates for the rating category from Table 3 in the Standard & Poor’s
publication "Ratings Performance 1999" (February 2000). These show average one year
default rates for the respective rating categories of 0% (AAA), 0.01% (AA), 0.04% (A),
0.21% (BBB), 0.91% (BB) and 5.16% (B). These figures may not be fully comparable with
Basel PD%. The risk weights for those rating categories under the standardised approach are
shown based on paragraph 35 of the Consultative Document.
Source. Clifford Chance.
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Hence, while the 1988 Accord attributed a risk-weight of 100% to all loans
to private corporate borrowers, the standardised approach of the new
Accord introduces a grading of risk-weights, which includes 20%, 50%,
100% and 150%, depending on the probability of default attributed to the
borrower. Going further, the internal-ratings based approach makes even
finer-toothed distinctions possible.
While the general principle of making capital-requirements more sensitive
to actual risks is widely welcomed among banks, the concerns originate in
the perception that in the current draft, the particular distribution of
weightings would result in higher overall required capital holdings for
many banks. The reason for this is that while both the standardised
approach and the internal-ratings based approach allow a substantial
lowering of minimum capital holdings for borrowers with excellent credit
ratings (ranging from AAA to A), they do in fact require higher capital-
holdings for debtors with a rating worse than BB. Even the relatively
respectable credit rating of BB (with a default probability of around 1%) is
likely to require a 25% increase in capital holdings under the internal-
ratings based approach. Given that in Italy, for instance, the probability of
default for bank borrowers has historically ranged between 1.6% and 8.5%
(i.e. between BB and lower), this seems to imply significantly higher
required capital holdings (both under the standardised and under the IRB-
approaches) compared to the current Accord. It should be added that the
internal-ratings based approach, which offers further capital savings on
investment-grade borrowers when compared to the standardised approach
(with most of the savings accruing for borrowers with ratings roughly
between AA- and BBB-), the required holdings are significantly higher
than under the current Accord below the rating of BB (The almost
exponential rise in the graph is somewhat misleading, since it is plotted on
log-scale). The Bank of England has calculated that a bank following the
IRB foundation approach would experience a 287% increase in required
capital holdings on loans to a corporate borrower rated B, and a 488%
increase on loans to a corporate borrower rated CCC.
2
It is these higher requirements for loans to medium or low-rated borrowers
that have also generated concerns about the implications of Basel II for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for a large part
of economic activity in Europe. It is feared that Basel II will make it more
                                                                
2 Calculated from numbers from the Bank of England´s  Quarterly Bulletin, Spring
2001, as quoted in Griffith-Jones & Spratt (2001).MORITZ MEIER-EWERT
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expensive for them to attain bank-finance, and they will have to start
looking for alternative forms of finance. This fear lies at the heart of the
recent statement by the German Chancellor that in its current form, Basel 2
was “unacceptable to Germany”.
3 Not only will SMEs suffer from the
higher requirements on lower-rated borrowers, they will also in some shape
or form have to bear the costs of attaining a rating by the External Credit
Rating Agencies, (which are still relatively rare in Europe). The Basel
Committee has expressed its readiness to accommodate these fears through
lower requirements for SME lending.
4
Of course, it has to be added that the final effect of these high risk-weights
could be attenuated to some extent by the fact that some non-bank
investors, such as asset management firms, insurance companies and
pension funds (who are indifferent to risk-weights) could arbitrage. Also,
various risk-mitigation techniques could be used to lower the cost of
lending.
5 Nevertheless, given the size of the increase in required capital
holdings for low-grade borrowers, it is likely to have some effect.
It should further be mentioned that in making these calibrations, it is very
difficult to account for the dynamic responses of banks to the changed
environment. The extent to which these extra requirements are
compensated for by the lower requirements on investment-grade loans very
much depends on the individual risk-profile of banks. If banks maintain
their current exposures, many of them could therefore be justified in
fearing an increase in their overall capital requirements. However, if
capital requirements on loans to borrowers with a BB rating will require
more capital in the future, it may be that banks will simply shift their
lending activity to less capital-intensive credit grades, implying a credit
crunch for some (low-rated) borrowers.
It is in the light of considerations like this that the BCBS is anticipating the
need to reduce the calibrations of the foundation IRB approach.
6
                                                                
3 See The Economist, 8 November 2001.
4 See Bank for International Settlements (2001a). This reduction would be in addition
to the existing provision in the January proposal allowing some SME loans to be
treated as retail exposures. I am very grateful to Andrea Resti for pointing this out.
5 On these points, see Reisen (2001), section 3.
6 See Bank for International Settlements (2001a).B ASEL II – THE R EMAINING ISSUES
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b) Operational risk
A second reason for the fears of higher capital requirements is the
introduction of a new category of “operational risk”, the coverage of which
should more or less represent 20% of total capital requirements.
7 Many
industry-representatives argued that the definition of operational risk used,
namely “The risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events” is
too general and unclear. Furthermore, the assumed relationship between
the income of a bank and the level of operational risk it faces has been
contested. Given the lack of precise knowledge about the nature of the
risks faced, many people argue that the current capital requirement is
excessive, and that greater emphasis should be put on providing incentives
for companies to improve their operational risk-management tools. The
BCBS has taken these criticisms on board and has stated in recent
communication
8 that the capital requirement on operational risk is likely to
be lowered from 20% to 12%.
c) Specialised credit institutions
Thirdly, it was argued that the risk-weights, which a number of specialised
industries would be assigned under the new Accord, do not adequately
reflect their creditworthiness. Examples of this are leasing companies and
factoring or credit-providers, which have always posed difficulties for the
application of the Basel Accord.
Initially, a problem arises within the EU, since specialised credit
institutions fall into different regulatory categories in different Member
States. While they qualify as banks and thus fall under the Basel Accord in
some countries (like France), they are technically treated differently and do
not fall under it in others (like Italy). Hence the Basel Accord will not
apply to all specialised credit institutions in the same way.
However, even to the extent that it does apply, it was argued that the new
Accord does not adequately take into account the particular circumstances
of these institutions. It does not recognise that their focus on niche-markets
leads to the acquisition of special expertise, which may allow them to
attain much lower costs of recovery than would have been expected from
the ordinary ratings of their customer base. The new Accord does also not
allow for the specific methods of risk-mitigation used in this industry,
                                                                
7 See Cornford (2001), section 11, for more detail.
8 See Bank for International Settlements (2001c).MORITZ MEIER-EWERT
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since its definition of collateral is rather narrow. Hence, under the
standardised approach, specialised credit institutions are likely to be faced
with what are perceived to be unnecessarily high capital-requirements.
This problem can to some extent be remedied if an internal ratings-based
system is used, but of course that is only available to some specialised
institutions.
2.2 … or too low ?
Despite the almost unanimous view of industry that required capital
holdings would increase, at least a convincing theoretical case can be made
for how the new framework could lead to an overall lowering of capital
holdings. It should not be forgotten that competitive market pressures are
likely to create a single integrated capital requirement faced by the
consumer: This capital requirement would be equal to the IRB-approach
above the rating of BB, and to the standardised approach beyond it. The
reason for this is that if one assumes that differences in capital
requirements translate directly into differences in the price of credit, then
advanced banks under the IRB approach will be able to offer loans to
borrowers with excellent ratings at a cheaper price than less sophisticated
banks under the standardised approach. Hence any customer with excellent
ratings will use the services of the former. At the same time, the opposite is
true for loans to borrowers with a very bad credit rating. They will find that
– since sophisticated banks face almost prohibitively high capital –
requirements for their category of borrowers under the IRB approach –
loans can be attained more cheaply from less sophisticated banks under the
standardised approach. Hence, all lenders rated below BB are likely to use
the services of the latter banks. The overall level of capital holdings is then
given by the composite curve described above. If one also takes into
account that the Basel Committee has decided to attach a 100% rating to
unrated borrowers (even though those with a rating worse than BB are
assigned 150%), which may lead to adverse selection, meaning that
effectively 100 % would be the upper ceiling even under the standardised
approach, it is not clear that overall capital requirements will rise at all. Of
course, the degree to which this will take place depends both on whether
the sophisticated banks will be able to maintain their margins by focussing
only on investment-grade borrowers (which may only be possible after
some consolidation in the banking sector) and on whether small banks will
be willing to enter into the market for loans to e.g. developing countries.
Given the potentially large financial incentives, however, the possibilityB ASEL II – THE R EMAINING ISSUES
9
cannot be dismissed out of hand. Indeed, the fact that such a desire for
“cherry-picking” exists can be demonstrated by the fact that a number of
banks have requested in their submissions to the Basel Committee that the
standardised approach and the IRB approach should be useable
simultaneously in different portfolios, which would result in the expected
lowering. The overall effect would be a decline in the level of defence
against systemic risk.
The results of the recent “Second Quantitative Impact Study” carried out
by the Basel Committee seem to suggest that the net effect of the January
Proposals would be an increase in the required capital holdings for almost
all banks.
9 It is on the basis of this that the Committee is now working on
modifications to the proposals that would serve to adjust the capital
requirements on certain exposures such that they are slightly higher on
investment-grade borrowers and lower on borrowers with lower credit
ratings.
10 Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that this impact study
only considers the effect that imposing the new proposals onto the current
exposures of banks would have, and does not take into account the
dynamic response of banks to the changed environment. Thus the threat of
a lower level of protection against systemic risk due to lower capital
requirements still stands.
2.3 The need for a proper debate
With both an increase and a lowering of capital requirements being at least
conceivable, it is crucial that this issue is subjected to further scrutiny. It is
even more important that the final update of the Accord is preceded by a
deliberation of what level of capital holdings would constitute a socially
desired trade-off between the level of protection against systemic risk on
the one hand and the dynamism of the banking sector and its welfare
implications on the other.
The current overall level of 8% may not be sufficient to provide socially
desired levels of protection against systemic risk (especially in the face of
increased procyclicality – see Section 3). This is particularly the case, if the
distribution of risk-weights causes banks to refocus their activities on low-
risk borrowers, implying an overall lowering of requirements.
During the negotiations for the 1988 Accord, the 8% finally agreed upon
were largely an outcome of the fact that most banks (particularly in the US)
                                                                
9 Bank for International Settlements (2001b).
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were holding the equivalent of this level, and it was the easiest solution
politically to stop the perceived competitive lowering of standards by
making the current level compulsory.
11 This does not necessarily mean,
however, that this level adequately meets popular preferences for the level
of risk-insurance. In deciding on this adequate level, one needs to be clear
over the trade-off at hand. A rough-and-ready guess would assume that the
level of insurance against systemic risk increases with the percentage of
capital required. Hence, requiring 15% instead of 8%, for instance, would
mean that a greater amount of capital is held by banks, and can thus be
used in the case of a bank collapse that is threatening to have broader
systemic consequences. Since the amount is greater, it is likely that even
certain crises that (for reasons of their severity) could not be prevented
with the 8% capital required now, may still be prevented. On the other
hand, of course, there are likely to be real costs to higher capital
requirements. Firstly, the transition to a higher level of capital from the
current 8% could quite conceivably lead to a severe credit-crunch, with
potentially recessionary implications as banks are building up their capital
reserves. While this effect is almost certainly temporary - with a new
equilibrium reached once all banks (who are currently applying the
Accord) have moved to the higher levels of capital - these transition-costs
are a very real part of the political calculation. Secondly, even once the
transition has been completed, the equilibrium will look slightly different
from the current state of the world: Not only is the higher level of capital
required likely to make banking less profitable, but more importantly, the
comparatively greater cost of credit is also likely to lead to lower overall
levels of investment and hence economic growth. These negative effects
could to some extent be mitigated by a rise in equity financing, but will
nevertheless be real. (This list of potential positive and negative effects is
by no means meant to be exhaustive, and its main purpose is to draw
attention to the need for more studies in this area.)
Ideally, a political trade-off between these costs and benefits would need to
be made (and the result of this deliberation may just as well turn out to be
much lower capital requirements), and should be informed by much more
detailed study of the likely effects of such moves.
                                                                
11 On the history of the 1988 Accord, see Kapstein (1991).B ASEL II – THE R EMAINING ISSUES
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3. Procyclicality and banking crises
It is by now widely agreed that the new Accord will have more procyclical
effects than its predecessor, meaning that its application could increase the
amplitude of the business cycle and cause excessive volatility in the
availability of capital, which in turn may lead to the occurrence of both
currency and banking crises. Concerns over this issue are particularly
appropriate, since there are at least three elements of the Accord that could
amplify its procyclicality.
3.1 Increased risk-sensitivity
Firstly, it is generally recognised that the increased risk-sensitivity
introduced in the latest proposals – both through the finer distinctions of
risk-weights in the standardised approach and through the IRB-approach –
will lead banks to act more procyclically. During a downturn, as the
probability of default by individual borrowers increases, banks will be
required to increase their capital holdings, thus increasing the cost of
capital and contributing further to the downturn. The Basel Committee’s
plea to make Banks assess their borrowers by how well they have
withstood ”normal business stresses“ and assign grades on probability of
default using 1-year horizons is unlikely to have a large effect in this
context. The Basel Committee argues further that the impact of the factors
increasing procyclicality will be mitigated by the changed ex-ante risk-
appetites of lenders. Unfortunately, this expected positive effect of the new
Accord would not be distributed evenly among the countries having to
apply the Accord.
12
3.2 The use of external credit rating agencies
Procyclicality has also been the main criticism directed at the newly
introduced usage of external rating agencies to assign risk-weights to
borrowers. Past experiences cast some doubt over the ability of these
agencies to adequately identify the probability of default in a number of
cases.
13 While those with a penchant for historical perspective may point
towards the fact that a majority of the countries that defaulted during the
Great Depression between 1929 and 1935 had still been assigned
investment-grade ratings by Moody’s in 1929, even the Asian crisis in
1997/1998 was characterised by the fact that many of the countries
                                                                
12 This argument is made in Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001), p. 12.
13 This section heavily draws on Cornford (2000), Section VI. A.MORITZ MEIER-EWERT
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involved were subject to very swift downgrading. Cornford points out that
“Thailand, for example, was downgraded four notches by both Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s between July 1997 and early 1998; Indonesia five
notches by Moody’s and six by Standard & Poor’s between June 1997 and
early 1998; and the Republic of Korea 6 notches by Moody’s and no less
than 10 by Standard & Poor’s during the same period.”
14 It was instances
like this that led to worries that the ratings by these agencies simply
parallel (or even follow) changes in market sentiment, and thus exacerbate
fluctuations of conditions in credit markets and facilitate financial crises.
Indeed, studies examining the yield-spreads before and after an
announcement by a rating agency are divided over whether the
announcement had an independent impact. Thus it is at least conceivable
that an accentuation of fluctuations in the availability and cost of financing
from credit markets is the result. This is more so the case for ratings of
sovereign lenders, since external ratings agencies may have private
information with regard to corporate borrowers. Given the more risk-
sensitive weightings, the effect such sudden swings could have on the cost
of credit for many developing countries particularly at the time of crisis are
potentially very dangerous.
This problem becomes even more acute, if the results of research carried
out by an economist at the Institute for International Economics prove to
be accurate. Liliana Rojas-Suarez argued that the current indicators used to
predict crises in emerging markets are failing completely in providing
useful signals, because they do not take into account the specificities of
these countries. While these very same indicators may have their use in the
analysis of developed economies, it needs to be taken into account that the
dynamics of crises develop differently in emerging markets. In addition to
the frequently bemoaned severe deficiencies in the accounting and
regulatory framework, developing countries differ crucially from
developed ones in that they lack liquid markets for bank shares,
subordinated debt and other bank liabilities needed to validate the “real”
worth of a bank as opposed to its accounting value. Hence classic
indicators may not work in the same way.
 15
These substantive problems of procyclicality deriving from the use of
External Rating Agencies are supplemented by some practical issues,
which may arise in the implementation of the proposals. For instance, it
                                                                
14 Cornford (2000), p. 18.
15 Rojas-Suarez (2001).B ASEL II – THE R EMAINING ISSUES
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has been found that External Ratings Agencies frequently disagree in their
ratings of some countries or private borrowers. Andrew Cornford quotes a
survey of the sovereign ratings of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, which
shows that as of June 1995 they agreed for investment-grade ratings in just
over half of the cases, while for ratings below investment grade in they
agreed in less than one third of the cases. Since these disagreements are
heavily skewed towards the developing/transition country end of the
spectrum, Cornford argues, this would make the impact on these
economies of the adoption of risk-weights based on agencies’ ratings
particularly difficult to forecast.
16
The Basel Committee is trying to address this difficulty of procyclicality
and the problem arising from the fact that Ratings by Agencies like
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s would not be available for all borrowers
(a problem that appears particularly acute outside the United States) by
allowing these ratings to be supplemented by ratings of several national
export credit assessment institutions, which increases the likelihood of
ratings being available for sovereign borrowers. Unfortunately, this
proposal is not free from problems, either. Indeed, the same criticism of
procyclicality has been levelled at these institutions. This is particularly the
case since the methodology of these two types of assessment agencies
seems to be converging towards “best commercial practice”.
17
Hence, there are a number of difficulties with the use of External Ratings
Agencies, chief among which is the strong indication that they would
exacerbate fluctuations in the cost of external financing for developing
countries, and enhance the procyclical effect of the new Accord.
3.3 Banks’ internal risk-management techniques and herding
Finally, there is a third factor potentially contributing to this trend: This is
the possibly inherent procyclicality of banks’ internal risk management
behaviour, which is given a prominent role in the internal-ratings-based
approach. In a recent paper, Avinash Persaud showed how procyclicality
can arise from the combination of the use of DEAR (daily earnings at risk)
limits among banks and herding behaviour.
18 He argued that herding
behaviour can be seen to occur when banks or investors like to buy what
others are buying, sell what other are selling, and own what others are
                                                                
16 Cornford (2000), p. 18.
17 See Griffith-Jones & Spratt (2001).
18 This section heavily draws upon Persaud (2000).MORITZ MEIER-EWERT
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owning. There are a number of incentives for such behaviour (most of
which originate in the circumstances of imperfect information, and in the
remuneration schemes for investors and bankers), and Persaud holds that a
lot of evidence points in the direction that herding occurs quite frequently
in the markets. For instance, of the 78 crashes that occurred after the EMS
crisis (He defines a crash as a 10% fall in the real exchange rate over three
months), 70% of them occurred within three years and the contagion
observed does not follow the trading-links between these countries. When
considered in a herding environment, the widespread use of DEAR-limits
by banks could contribute severely to financial volatility and crises. The
reason for this is that once an external event triggers an increase in
volatility among certain stock-values, the DEAR-limits of some investors
holding this stock will be hit. The resulting selling- (and corresponding
buying-) decisions will then in turn increase volatility in other stocks and
cause the DEAR-limits of other banks to be hit, etc. What is crucial to
recognise is that it is not the DEAR-limit method in itself that is
problematic, but merely the fact that so many banks use it. Recent
econometric research has also confirmed, that a market in which the use of
Value-at-risk methodologies is widespread shows greater volatility than a
market, in which these techniques are not used.
19 While these
considerations probably apply most strongly to the treatment of market
risk, they do raise more general questions about the direction of the
Accord.
Of course, it is true that no system of capital requirements will be free from
procyclical effects. Nevertheless, this argument should not be used to
justify any level of procyclicality, and indeed the effects should be
minimised as far as possible. Perhaps a function for capital requirements
with a somewhat lower gradient would serve to decrease the degree of
procyclicality.
An additional measure that could be taken to prevent exaggerated
procyclical behaviour is to introduce a conceptual distinction between
“expected losses” and “risk”. While expected losses should properly be
seen as a cost and should be covered by reserves, they should be
distinguished from risk (unexpected losses), which need to be covered by
capital. At present, capital is simply a large blanket covering both risks and
expected losses. Fine-tuning of risk-weights and a requirement for anti-
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cyclical provisioning would be even more effective – if more ambitious –
methods.
Finally, in view of the numerous concerns about the procyclicality and the
resulting potential vulnerability to crises highlighted both in connection
with the use of External Credit Agencies and with the internal risk-
management systems of banks, it would seem adequate that more research
on risk-assessment and -management is carried out before measures as
potentially momentous as those implied by the proposed Accord are taken.
4. Basel II and developing countries
The relatively high capital requirements for low-rated borrowers do not
only affect SMEs. They could also have very serious adverse consequences
for developing countries, with corresponding effects on their welfare and
development.
The issue of the impact of the Basel Accord on developing countries is not
new, and has already been discussed at the time of the introduction of the
1988 Accord. The most pertinent issue then was undoubtedly the
introduction of a somewhat arbitrary distinction between OECD member
states and non-OECD countries in assigning risk-weights for loans to
sovereign borrowers. Hence, loans to governments of OECD member
states were assigned a 0% risk-weight, and thus did not need to be insured
by any capital holdings, all other sovereign loans with a maturity of longer
than 1 year were assigned a 100% weight. This system was seen as
creating unjustified incentives for lending to OECD countries and hence as
essentially serving to finance the budget-deficits of OECD countries. It
also meant that some developing countries focussed on hastily joining the
OECD in order to attain access to cheap loans, and – like Mexico and
South Korea – experienced harsh financial crises soon after.
More criticism was drawn by the exception to this rule, which stated that
loans to non-OECD sovereigns and banks would be subject to a risk-
weight of only 20% (as opposed to 100%), as long as the maturity does not
exceed 1 year. Recent research has shown that this rule created strong
preferences among banks to give short-term loans to developing country
borrowers (sovereign or bank). The ensuing build-up of short-term
exposures in many developing countries may have contributed
substantially to the Asian financial crisis and could have unnecessarily
enhanced the volatility of capital and the frequency of crises.
20
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Both of these shortcomings have been addressed in some way in the
proposed new Accord: The distinction between members and non-
members of the OECD is abolished in favour of a more fine-toothed
system for sovereign loans. The new Accord assigns risk-weights of 0%,
20%, 50%, 100% or 150% depending on the credit rating of the sovereign
(Though unrated sovereigns are assigned only a 100% rating). While
continuing uncertainty over the precise application of the new Accord
makes predictions about possible winners and losers difficult, Andrew
Cornford shows that these proposed changes could have important
consequences for a number of countries.
21 If, for instance, recent ratings by
Standard and Poor’s are applied, the risk-weights of certain Asian countries
(like Singapore and Taiwan POC) would fall from currently 100% to 0%.
Some other middle-income developing countries would also receive lower
risk-weights (e.g. Chile, China, and Thailand). In contrast, some OECD
member states would lose their current 0% weights, and a number of
developing countries may have their weightings increased from 100% to
150% (though perhaps they could try to avoid a rating so as to maintain
their current risk weighting).
The bias in favour of short-term lending to developing countries has also
been addressed to some extent, in that the threshold maturity for
preferential treatment has been lowered to three months. The jump between
risk-weights has also become smaller, though Deutsche Bank still
estimates that the current jump from 20% for double-A ratings to 50% for
single-A rating significantly overstates the differences in probability of
default, hence creating incentives for short-term lending.
22
Both the abolition of the arbitrary distinction of countries according to their
OECD membership as well as the lowering of the threshold maturity for
preferential treatment should be welcomed. Nevertheless, despite serving
to reduce some of the negative impact of the 1988 version, the proposed
new Accord does create perhaps even more significant new problems.
4.1 Higher capital-requirements for their category of borrowers
The biggest problem is posed by the fact that a large number of both
sovereign and bank borrowers from developing countries are likely to be
assigned higher risk-weights under the new Accord. As was already
referred to in the section on overall capital requirements, the minimum
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capital requirements under the IRB approach (at least in the current version
of the proposal) are very much higher than requirements under the current
Accord for ratings lower than B. Since most developing countries are to be
found in this category, the impact could be large. Hence, while the IRB
approach would only assign a 40% risk weight to countries with a triple-B
rating (such as China, Korea and Egypt), countries with a double-B rating
would fare a lot worse: countries like Brazil, Colombia and India would be
assigned a 379% risk weight under the IRB approach. Countries like
Argentina, Jamaica and Pakistan with a single B-rating are assigned a
630% risk-weight, and are thus effectively cut off from international bank-
finance.
23 Even under the standardised approach, the risk-weights for
countries with ratings lower than B- increase from 100% under the 1988
Approach to 150%, meaning that the cost of loans for these countries will
unambiguously increase. The consequences of regulations like this for
welfare in developing countries could potentially be disastrous.
How one evaluates the degree of the impact depends largely on the
scenario one finds most likely: It seems at least plausible that the steep
increase in capital-requirements for loans to developing countries under the
IRB-approach will effectively lead sophisticated banks to exit lending to
this category of borrowers and to concentrate on those categories, for
whom their IRB approach yields the greatest advantages. Others hold,
however, that the less sophisticated banks will step in and start lending
more to developing countries, since the standardised approach gives them a
competitive advantage in this area. While this might ease the plight of
capital-deprived developing countries, some questions can be raised about
the prudence of encouraging less sophisticated banks to handle high-risk
loans. Finally, developing countries may, of course, be able to avoid any
negative change in position by avoiding a rating, and by therefore be
entitled to a 100% rating, but the widespread use of this technique would
probably not be the objective of the new Accord, which relies so heavily
on external ratings. It should also be mentioned that – were developing
countries able to avoid a lower rating– a consequence of this would be that
overall capital holdings in the banking system have decreased (after
lowerings in the higher ratings), and that the level of insurance against
systemic risk has decreased.
This issue is also one of great pertinence for the European Union, since the
higher capital requirements may also apply to bank-loans to some of the
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accession-countries. The Commission should bear this in mind when
drafting its implementation of the new Capital Accord.
4.2 Loss of competitive advantage in financial services
It should also be mentioned that the restructuring of the banking industry
that can be expected to result from the Accord would have adverse
consequences for the financial services sector in developing countries.
Since a number of large sophisticated banks who are in a position to take
benefit from the lower risk-weights of the IRB approach are likely to
dominate the industry, they will also be able to offer cheaper services than
less sophisticated banks in developing countries. Hence, their gaining
market access to developing countries could freeze the current comparative
advantage of financial services industries of developed countries. Indeed,
unless banks from developing countries are able to compete using special
expertise of their markets, it is likely that for them situations like that of the
Czech Republic or Hungary, where 90% of banks are foreign-owned,
might become the norm.
 24
These potential distributional consequences of the revised Accord
undoubtedly raise the gravest concerns, and must be addressed before a
new Accord is implemented. The main concerns of many developing
countries, namely being cut off from bank lending and being exposed to
increased volatility, could be addressed to some extent through a change in
the function of capital adequacy requirements so as to lower the gradient,
since such a function would both reduce the capital requirements on loans
to developing countries (compared to the proposed IRB and standardised
approaches) and decrease the degree of procyclicality of the Accord.
4.3 Implementation costs
Unfortunately, there are a number of other adverse implications of the
Basel II Accord for developing countries. All of these derive from the fact
that while the Accord was originally conceived to apply to internationally
active banks in the Member States of the BIS, today more than 120
countries (most of them developing) apply its provisions more or less
rigorously. The spread of the Basel Accord was brought about partly by
efforts of the EU to make capital standards binding for banks in the
European Union, which led to the application of principles similar to those
of the BCBS in all its Member States, and partly through active
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proselytising by the BCBS. The most important factor, however, was the
internationalisation of banking, which meant that granting market access to
foreign banks increasingly came to depend on their being subject to
adequate domestic supervision (as in the American “Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act” of 1991).
25 Hence, developing countries
were obliged to make their banks subject to the Basel requirements.
Indeed, in its latest communications, the BCBS has explicitly changed the
terminology from encouraging “all internationally active banks” to accept
the Accord, to encouraging “all significant banks”, meaning that almost
global coverage is aimed for.
26
It is clear is that the costs of establishing adequate supervisory structures
will be a considerable burden for developing countries. This is all the more
relevant, given that the complexity of the new Accord and the IRB-
approach in particular has led some commentators to hold that even
countries with highly developed banking sectors – like Germany – may not
yet have the supervisory expertise to back it up. Of course, it can be argued
that the skills required for supervisors in each country only need to match
the sophistication of its respective financial sector (or just exceed it), and
hence will not be too burdensome for developing countries, but a closer
look at the reality of banking supervision will prove the contrary. While it
is true that foreign subsidiaries of sophisticated banks in developing
countries ought strictly to be under the supervision of their head office in
the (developed) home country, the supervision they are subject to in
practise is severely lacking. Few people will argue that an annual visit by
an accountant from head office for a week constitutes adequate
supervision, and hence developing countries’ supervisors will need to
understand even more complex banking systems. It is very unlikely that
developing countries will be in a position to develop or recruit this
necessary expertise. The obvious alternative – namely limiting the kind of
activities that subsidiaries of foreign banks are licensed to carry out in
developing countries – is not very realistic, since foreign banks often gain
access to developing country markets in times of financial crises, where
foreign capital is badly needed.
27 Hence, there is little doubt that
developing countries ought to be given technical assistance for the
implementation of pillars II and III of the planned Accord.
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27 See Cornford (2000), p. 21 and Footnote 82.MORITZ MEIER-EWERT
20
4.4 Representativeness of the BCBS
Finally, the fact that standards with such serious implications for
developing countries are written by a relatively unaccountable body
composed of representatives of the 12 developed Member-States of the
BCBS raises serious representation issues. The current set-up of a small
committee of reasonably like-minded standard-setters has yielded a
number of benefits, such as greater efficiency and decision-making by
consensus, which in turn has helped the implementation of the standards.
At the same time, a brief look at the distributional consequences of the
results achieved today makes clear that this system may have exhausted its
viability. Indeed, bringing more developing countries into the standard-
setting body may enhance its credibility in the future. As Cornford points
out, the BCBS has already taken steps in this direction. The “Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”, for instance, were prepared
in a group of extended membership, which included Chile, China, the
Czech Republic, Hong Kong (China), Mexico, Russia and Thailand, as
well as another 9 associated countries: This could be a model. Another idea
would be to provide for the participation of developing and transition
economies in the committee on a rotating basis.
28
5. Implications for the structure of the banking industry
One of the main reasons for concluding the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was
the fear of a decline in capital reserves by banks (and the resulting greater
exposure to systemic risk), which was spurred by the competitive pressure
originating from those banks who took advantage of the loose regulatory
framework they were operating in by holding ever-lower levels of capital,
so as to be able to offer loans at more competitive rates. The original Basel
Accord tried to stop this competitive dynamic by setting a common
minimum level of capital requirements applying to all internationally
active banks of BIS Member-States.
Similarly, one of the reasons for updating the 1988 Accord was the
perception that innovations in financial instruments since the late 1980´s
had created a situation in which highly sophisticated banks were in a better
situation to arbitrage by using various techniques to increase higher-risk,
higher-yielding assets in relation to a given level of capital, giving them a
competitive advantage.
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Hence the update attempted to close the loopholes that had been created,
and – by taking the individual circumstances of each bank into account
more – to re-establish a level-playing field. As the proposed new Accord
makes greater allowance for risk-mitigation techniques and narrows the
distances between the risk-pockets, which previously created room for
arbitrage, it certainly goes some way towards addressing the perverse
incentives presented by the old Accord. However, there is a risk that the
introduction of the IRB-approach for some sophisticated banks will
actually give them such a large competitive advantage vis-à-vis the less
sophisticated smaller banks (at least in certain market-segments) that it will
result in a considerable restructuring in the industry. The reason for this is
that the risk weights for investment-grade borrowers (those above a rating
of BBB-) are somewhat lower under the IRB approach than under the
standardised approach of the new Accord, meaning that banks using the
IRB-approach are likely to be able to serve those borrowers at more
competitive conditions. The opposite is true for borrowers below the rating
of BB, where the standardised approach implies lower capital
requirements, meaning that less sophisticated banks may have a
competitive advantage in lending to risky borrowers.  This is all the more
worrying, since the IRB-approach is likely to be available only to a select
few large banks of high sophistication even in the medium run. It is
expected that of the 9000 banks in the US, only 20 will be in a position to
adopt the IRB approach.
29 The consolidation this may trigger in the
banking sector could raise questions for competition-policy.
6. Conclusions
A close look at the proposed new Accord draws attention to the
considerable degree of uncertainty with regard to its implications (for
instance on the level of overall capital requirements) and on some issues
raises the spectre of some potentially adverse consequences. In the worst
case, the adoption of the Accord as currently proposed could lead to
substantial restructuring in the banking industry, which could have the
undesirable outcome of allowing some sophisticated banks using the IRB
approach to dominate the market, leading to potentially oligopolistic
behaviour. In addition to this, the numerous procyclical elements built in to
the Accord could make the entire financial system more volatile, leading to
more crises. It is against this background of greater volatility, that the
uncertainty regarding the implications of the new Accord for overall
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capital holdings -–and hence protection against systemic risk – is even
more worrying. Finally, the new Accord may lead some developing
countries to be cut off from bank-lending altogether, with considerable
adverse consequences for welfare.
Even if this worst-case scenario seems overstated, it is to be hoped that the
issues outlined briefly in this paper can be addressed during the prolonged
consultation-period, so that a successful update of the 1988 Accord can be
implemented in 2005.B ASEL II – THE R EMAINING ISSUES
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